Efter- og videreuddannelse
Kursussøgning

Deterrence: Strategy, Theory, Practice

Course content

Deterrence may not always have been explicitly theorized or recognized as a distinct theoretical concept, yet this phenomenon has been a fundamental aspect of conflicts throughout humanity’s history. The concept foregrounds the idea to prevent the use of force by inducing a threat and thus discouraging an opponent from taking an undesirable course of action. This course explores deterrence and the broader spectrum of coercive diplomacy, focusing on their foundational concepts, alongside their historical evolution and contemporary applications.

 

By integrating theoretical insights with detailed case studies from a nation-state perspective, the course equips students with a thorough understanding of how these strategies are developed, implemented, and adapted to address diverse security challenges. It also critically examines the costs, risks, and broader political consequences of employing deterrence and coercive diplomacy in varying geopolitical contexts.

 

The rationale behind deterrence is relatively straightforward: it offers a safer and arguably more cost-effective means of advancing security objectives compared to engaging in war. However, deterrence is inherently elusive. Its potency depends on its credibility, which is often linked to military capability and the clear communication of one’s interests and commitment. But in the end, its effectiveness remains uncertain until it is tested and fails. Conversely, what may seem like a successful instance of deterrence, validating the credibility of a chosen strategy, can be influenced by a myriad of other factors. The intricacies involved in assessing the credibility of deterrence underscore the inherent complexity of studying this phenomenon, both as a theory and as a strategy/policy.

When the Cold War ended, academia and professional military education reduced the emphasis on the study of deterrence, shifting attention to other, more friendly practices of international relations. But with the geopolitical upheavals of the 2010s, deterrence is back with a vengeance. Today’s strategists are working in a complex environment where the actors to be deterred may not be states exclusively, and activities occur in multiple – and not essentially physical – domains. The invasion of Ukraine in 2022 definitively marked the endured relevance of inter-state conflict and put pressure on state actors in Europe and elsewhere to re-access the enduring importance – and complexity – of deterrence in the contemporary security environment.

 

The first module will introduce the genealogy of deterrence, its historical origins first as distinctive stratagem and state practice, and the follow-up theoretical sophistication extending to various related concepts and schools. Building upon this, students will learn about critics of deterrence emerging towards the end of the Cold War. The second module will explore 21st century deterrence theory as well as the threats’ landscape contemporary deterrence adapts and responds to. In the second module, students will be introduced to several topical case studies and engage in a critical analysis of recent instances of deterrence and coercion in international relations. These not only include state versus state confrontations but also the challenge of deterring non-state actors such as terrorist groups, cyber criminals, pirates, or at least containing the risk they may pose.

 

Ultimately, the course offers students the opportunity to engage with the most pertinent strategic issues in international relations in the 21st century and develop a more nuanced understanding of how coercion matters politically.

Education

Full-degree students enrolled at the Department of Political Science, UCPH

  • MSc in Political Science
  • MSc in Social Science
  • MSc in Security Risk Management
  • Bachelor in Political Science

 

Full-degree students enrolled at the Faculty of Social Science, UCPH 

  • Master Programme in Psychology
  • Master Programme in Global Development
  • Master Programme in Social Science

 

The course is open to:

  • Exchange and Guest students from abroad
  • Credit students from Danish Universities
  • Open University students
Learning outcome

Knowledge:

  • Understand the relationship between military strategy, coercive diplomacy, and strategy-making.
  • Master core concepts and assumptions of deterrence theory, and critically evaluate the applicability of traditional nuclear deterrence arguments to emerging challenges in non-kinetic and multidomain warfare environments, including cyber and hybrid conflicts.
  • Recognize the contexts in which actors pursue coercive strategies and apply deterrence theory to study real-world politics.

 

Skills:

  • Understand the relationship between military strategy, coercive diplomacy, and strategy-making.
  • Master core concepts and assumptions of deterrence theory, and critically evaluate the applicability of traditional nuclear deterrence arguments to emerging challenges in non-kinetic and multidomain warfare environments, including cyber and hybrid conflicts.
  • Recognize the contexts in which actors pursue coercive strategies and apply deterrence theory to study real-world politics.

 

Competences:

  • Confidently navigate contemporary security challenges and recognize the strategic environments in which they arise.
  • Assess the effectiveness, risks, and limitations of coercive strategies in addressing security threats.
  • Identify and critique the tools and practices employed in nuclear and conventional deterrence and coercive diplomacy, comparing them to alternative approaches used in world politics.

The course aims to advance students’ theoretical understanding and to encourage practical exploration of deterrence concepts and discussions surrounding them.

In our lectures, I begin by introducing the theme for the week, emphasizing crucial topics within the assigned course literature. In class, participation thus requires active independent learning and preparation. Classes may be complemented by guest speakers who present their research and practical experiences.

Throughout the course, the dynamic learning environment is enhanced through group discussions and exercises, introducing document analysis and visual data to better understand how actors practice deterrence and what sources are relevant for the research.

Culminating in a simulation game (if course agenda allows), the course uniquely blends theory and practice, allowing students to apply their knowledge in a simulated real-world context, fostering experiential learning and strategic decision-making skills.

The examination takes place in a form of an ongoing assignment exam which allows me to gradually access the successful development of students’ skills and competences during the course: the first assignment is a piece of academic writing (essay or literature review) by completion of the first course module on deterrence theory, and the second assignment is an oral presentation in the form of a policy brief by completion of the second course module on deterrence strategy and practice. Presentations aim at the development of competencies in public speaking and research communication.

Theory:

  • Brodie, Bernard (Ed.). (1946). The Absolute Weapon: Atomic Power and World Order. New York: Harcourt, Brace.
  • Brodie, Bernard (1959) ‘The Anatomy of Deterrence’, World Politics, 11/2: 173-191.
  • Chernus, I. (1982). Mythologies of Nuclear War. Journal of the American Academy of Religion, 50(2), 255–273.
  • Freedman, Lawrence., & Michaels, J. H. (2019). The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
  • Jervis, Robert (1989). Rational Deterrence: Theory and Evidence. World Politics, 41(2), 183–207.
  • Jervis, Robert, & Snyder, Jack (1991). Dominoes and Bandwagons: Strategic Beliefs and Great Power Competition in the Eurasian Rimland (p. viii+299-viii+299). Oxford University Press, Incorporated.
  • Jervis, Robert (1984) The Illogic of American Nuclear Strategy. Cornell University Press.
  • Kaplan, Fred (2020) The Bomb: Presidents, Generals, and the Secret History of Nuclear War. New York: Simon & Schuster.
  • Knopf, Jeffrey W. (2010) ‘The Fourth Wave in Deterrence Research’, Contemporary Security Policy, 31/1: 1-33.
  • Lantis, Jeffrey S. (2009) ‘Strategic Culture and Tailored Deterrence: Bridging the Gap between Theory and Practice’, Contemporary Security Policy, 30/3: 467-485.
  • Lebow, Richard Ned, & Stein, J. G. (1989). Rational Deterrence Theory: I Think, Therefore I Deter. World Politics, 41(2), 208–224.
  • Lebow, Richard Ned (2001) ‘Deterrence and Reassurance: Lessons from the Cold War’, Global Dialogue, 3/4: 119-132.
  • Lupovici, Amir (2010). The Emerging Fourth Wave of Deterrence Theory—Toward a New Research Agenda. International Studies Quarterly, 54(3), 705–732.
  • Lupovici, Amir (2019). Toward a Securitization Theory of Deterrence. International Studies Quarterly, 63(1), 177–186.
  • Mälksoo, Maria (2021). A ritual approach to deterrence: I am, therefore I deter. European Journal of International Relations, 27(1), 53–78.
  • Mälksoo, M. (2024). Deterrence icons as status symbols: American forces in NATO’s eastern flank. Cooperation and Conflict, 0(0).
  • Michaels, J. H. (2024). Deterrence Studies: A field still in progress. Journal of Strategic Studies, 47(6–7), 1058–1079.
  • Morgan, P. M. (2003). Deterrence Now (1st ed., Vol. 89). Cambridge University Press.
  • Payne, K. B. (2001). The Fallacies of Cold War Deterrence and a New Direction. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky.
  • Sartori, Anne E. (2005). Deterrence by Diplomacy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
  • Schelling, Thomas C. (1967). Arms & Influence. Yale University Press.
  • Schelling, Thomas C. (1966) The Diplomacy of Violence. New Haven: Yale University Press.
  • Snyder, Jack L. (1977). The Soviet Strategic Culture: Implications for Limited Nuclear Operations. Santa Monica, CA: RAND

 

Strategy and practice:

  • Adamsky, Dmitri (2022). Russian nuclear orthodoxy: religion, politics, and strategy. Stanford University Press.
  • Adamsky, Dmitri (2024). The Russian way of deterrence : strategic culture, coercion, and war (1st ed.). Stanford University Press.
  • Adamsky, Dmitri (2018) ‘From Moscow with Coercion: Russian Deterrence Theory and Strategic Culture’, Contemporary Security Policy, 41/1: 33-60.
  • Anderson, Justin V., Larsen, Jeffrey A. and Holdorf, Polly M. (2013) Extended Deterrence and Allied Assurance: Key Concepts and Current Challenges for U.S. Policy. Colorado Springs: USAF Institute for National Security Studies.
  • Bahar, M. (2021). "Attaining Optimal Deterrence at Sea: A Legal and Strategic Theory for Naval Anti-Piracy Operations." Vanderbilt Law Review, 40(1), 1.
  • Cho, Huyun-Binn., & Petrovics, Ariel (2022). "North Korea’s Strategically Ambiguous Nuclear Posture." The Washington Quarterly, 45(2), 39-58.
  • Christensen, Thomas (2012). "The Meaning of the Nuclear Evolution: China's Strategic Modernization and US-China Security Relations." Journal of Strategic Studies, 35(4), 447-487.
  • Colby, Elbridge and Solomon, Jonathan (2015) ‘Facing Russia: Conventional Defence and Deterrence in Europe’, Survival, 57/6: 21-50.
  • Collins, Alan R. (1998), ‘GRIT, Gorbachev and the End of the Cold War’, Review of International Studies, 24/2: 201–19.
  • Cunningham, Fiona S., & Fravel, Taylor M. (2015). "Assuring Assured Retaliation: China's Nuclear Posture and U.S.-China Strategic Stability." International Security, 40(2), 7-50.
  • DiFilippo, Anthony (2006) Japan’s Nuclear Disarmament Policy and the US Security Umbrella. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
  • Driedger, Jonas J. (2022). Did Germany Contribute to Deterrence Failure against Russia in Early 2022? Central European Journal of International and Security Studies, 16(3), 152–171. https://doi.org/10.51870/TLXC9266
  • Freedman, Guy (2017) ‘Iranian Approach to Deterrence: Theory and Practice’, Comparative Strategy, 36/5: 400-412.
  • Freedman, Lawrence (2023, December 11). The Russo-Ukrainian War and the Durability of Deterrence. Survival Online. [Include the full URL if available]
  • Gavin, Francis J. (2020). Nuclear Weapons and American Grand Strategy. Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press.
  • Green, Brendan R., & Long, Austin (2017). "The MAD Who Wasn't There: Soviet Reactions to the Late Cold War Nuclear Balance." Security Studies, 26(6), 606-641.
  • Hong, Yong-Pyo (2011) ‘North Korea’s Strategic Culture and Threat Perception: Implications for Regional Security Cooperation’, Korea Observer, 42/1: 95-115.
  • Howard, Michael (1982/3) ‘Reassurance and Deterrence: Western Defense in the 1980s’, Foreign Affairs, 61/2: 309–24.
  • Huth, Paul and Russett, Bruce (1984) ‘What Makes Deterrence Work? Cases from 1900 to 1980’, World Politics, 36/4: 496-526.
  • Kennedy, Andrew B. (2011) ‘India’s Nuclear Odyssey: Implicit Umbrellas, Diplomatic Disappointments, and the Bomb’, International Security, 36/2: 120–53.
  • Knopf, Jeffrey W. (ed.) (2012), Security Assurances and Nuclear Nonproliferation. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
  • Kokoshin, Andrei (2011). Ensuring Strategic Stability in the Past and Present: Theoretical and Applied Questions. Boston, MA: Harvard Kennedy School, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, June 2011.
  • Lanoszka, Alexander (2016). "Russian hybrid warfare and extended deterrence in eastern Europe." International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-), 92(1), 175–195.
  • Lee, Dong S., & Alexandrova, Iordanka (2021). "North Korean nuclear strategy: envisioning assured retaliation." International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, 21(3), 371-400.
  • Lewis, Dennis. (2019, April). "Russia’s 'Strategic Deterrence' in Ukraine." Marshall Center Security Insights, Number 029.
  • Libicki, M. C. (2018). Expectations of Cyber Deterrence. Strategic Studies
  • Lupovici, Amir (2016). The power of deterrence : emotions, identity, and American and Israeli wars of resolve. Cambridge University Press.
  • Lupovici, Amir (2021). The Dog That Did Not Bark, the Dog That Did Bark, and the Dog That Should Have Barked: A Methodology for Cyber Deterrence Research. International Studies Review, 23(4), 1672–1698.
  • Lupovici, Amir (2023). Deterrence by delivery of arms: NATO and the war in Ukraine. Contemporary Security Policy, 44(4), 624–641.
  • Maurer, J. H. (1995). The Outbreak of the First World War: Strategic Planning, Crisis Decision Making, and Deterrence Failure. Westport, CT: Praeger.
  • Mearsheimer, John J. (1993). The Case for a Ukrainian Nuclear Deterrent. Foreign Affairs, 72(3), 50–66.
  • Sweijs, Tim and Osinga, Frans (2020) NL Arms Netherlands Annual Review of Military Studies. T.M.C. Asser Press The Hague.
  • Takacs, David (2017) ‘Ukraine’s Deterrence Failure: Lessons for the Baltic States’, Journal on Baltic Security, 3/1: 1-10.
  • Ven Bruusgaard, Kristin (2016) ‘Russian Strategic Deterrence’, Survival, 58/4: 7-26.
  • Waltz, Kenth N. (2012). Why Iran Should Get the Bomb: Nuclear Balancing Would Mean Stability. Foreign Affairs, 91(4), 2–5.
  • Wenger, Andreas, & Wilner, Alex (2012). Deterring Terrorism. Stanford University Press, Stanford.
  • Wilner, Alex S. (2011) ‘Deterring the Undeterrable: Coercion, Denial, and Delegitimization in Counterterrorism’, Journal of Strategic Studies, 34/1: 3-37.
  • Zhang, Shu Guang (1992) Deterrence and Strategic Culture: Chinese-American Confrontations, 1949-1958. Ithaca: Cornell University Press

It is recommended that prospective students interested in enrolling in this course possess a bachelor’s degree in a relevant field, such as history, political science, international relations, or international public law. Demonstrated interest in strategic studies, as well as independent orientation in issues of military and security affairs is an asset. The teaching is conducted in English.

Individual
Collective
Continuous feedback during the course of the semester
Feedback by final exam (In addition to the grade)
Peer feedback (Students give each other feedback)

 

I intend to combine peer and individual feedback. The main feedback provided after the final examination, on demand, in written form.

ECTS
15 ECTS
Type of assessment
Home assignment
Type of assessment details
Ongoing tests.
See the section regarding exam forms in the program curriculum for more information on guidelines and scope.
Aid
All aids allowed except Generative AI
Marking scale
7-point grading scale
Censorship form
No external censorship
Re-exam

In the semester where the course takes place: Free written assignment

In subsequent semesters: Free written assignment

Criteria for exam assessment

Meet the subject's knowledge, skill and competence criteria, as described in the goal description, which demonstrates the minimally acceptable degree of fulfillment of the subject's learning outcome.

Grade 12 is given for an outstanding performance: the student lives up to the course's goal description in an independent and convincing manner with no or few and minor shortcomings

Grade 7 is given for a good performance: the student is confidently able to live up to the goal description, albeit with several shortcomings

Grade 02 is given for an adequate performance: the minimum acceptable performance in which the student is only able to live up to the goal description in an insecure and incomplete manner

Single subject courses (day)

  • Category
  • Hours
  • Class Instruction
  • 56
  • Preparation
  • 160,5
  • Exercises
  • 96
  • Exam Preparation
  • 72
  • Exam
  • 28
  • English
  • 412,5

Kursusinformation

Language
English
Course number
ASTK18453U
ECTS
15 ECTS
Programme level
Full Degree Master
Bachelor
Duration

1 semester

Placement
Autumn
Price

http://polsci.ku.dk/uddannelser/eftervidereuddannelse/aabent_universitet/

Studyboard
Department of Political Science, Study Council
Contracting department
  • Department of Political Science
  • Department of Anthropology
  • Department of Psychology
  • Social Data Science
Contracting faculty
  • Faculty of Social Sciences
Course Coordinator
  • Mariia Vladymyrova   (3-796f64436c6976316e7831676e)
Saved on the 01-05-2025
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Københavns Universitet
Nørregade 10
1165 København K
Kontakt:
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